Prof. Dr., University of Leipzig, Theoretical Philosophy, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Science, Philosophical Anthropology
Title of Paper:
Who is afraid of HAL 9000? (Why an AI would be a miserable existence)
Subdisciplinary Area: Ontology, Social Ontology, Ethics
Keywords: AI, natural existence, artificial existence, living being, analogous intelligence
Abstract: My thesis is that as regards to Artificial Intelligence the problem that we are confronted with is not whether human existence is at risk from AI entities, but whether it is morally legitimate and ontologically possible to try to imitate the phenomenon of intelligence through technical means. I wonder whether it is a morally legitimate claim not because of the consequences of this endeavour, but concerning these artificial beings themselves. Is it ontologically possible for such an entity to comply with the reasons that lead to its construction? The reason is that the concept of artificial intelligence already contains a contradiction, which makes artificially intelligent entities something that cannot be realized as ‘positive’ existences.